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Risk source · ISO/IEC 27005

RS01 State-related actors (e.g. intelligence agencies)

Updated on 4 min Reviewed by: Cenedril Editorial
ISO/IEC 27005ISO 27001BSI IT-Grundschutz

A machine builder with 300 employees develops a new controller for wind turbines. A year before launch, a firewall vendor announces a vulnerability that has already been exploited for months. Forensics shows that design data and quote calculations sat on a foreign server for months, taken through exactly this device. Behind the attack was an actor with time, patience and a clear mission.

State actors are the risk source with the greatest resources. ISO/IEC 27005 lists them in Annex A as an example of risk sources described by their motivation and their ability to act. Their hallmark is endurance: they work over long periods, adapt their approach to the target and accept detours through suppliers and service providers to get there.

What is behind it?

This covers intelligence services, military cyber units and groups acting on behalf of a state or with its tolerance. Security vendors often report on them under the label “advanced persistent threat”. They pursue the political, economic or military goals of a state, and a single company is usually just one piece of the puzzle.

Resources and approach

  • Staying power. Campaigns are planned over months. The first foothold is often kept quiet for a long time before any data leaves.
  • Their own tools. State groups buy or discover vulnerabilities nobody knows yet and develop malware for a specific target.
  • Detours through the supply chain. When the real target is well protected, they first compromise a software vendor, an IT service provider or a small supplier with access.
  • Isolated networks. Some actors even reach networks without an internet connection, for example through prepared storage media or maintenance access.

Impact

Confidentiality comes first: design data, research, negotiating strategies and credentials. With sabotage, integrity and availability join in, for example when controllers are manipulated or systems are deliberately shut down during a political crisis. The damage often goes unnoticed for a long time, because the attacker has no interest in being seen.

Practical examples

Espionage through remote maintenance. A medical device manufacturer has its production lines maintained remotely by the supplier. The attackers first take over the supplier’s maintenance computer and from there enter the manufacturer’s network with valid access. What leaks is the dossier for an approval that was due to be filed the following year.

Tampered software update. Widely used administration software is manipulated at the vendor. The regular update installs a back door at thousands of customers. It is used at only a few selected organizations, among them a mid-sized aviation supplier.

Preparing for a crisis. During a routine check, a service provider finds an unknown program in the control system of a water utility. It has changed nothing, but it could switch off pumps on command. The analysis points to preparation for a possible conflict.

Typical threats

This risk source typically uses these BSI elementary threats:

Effective controls

Prevention:

Detection:

Response:

Risk sources in ISO 27005

ISO/IEC 27005 knows two routes to risk identification. In the event-based approach, risk sources and their objectives come first: who could want to harm the organization, what do they want to achieve, and through which interested parties do they get in? The asset-based approach starts from assets, threats and vulnerabilities. To estimate likelihood, the standard names for deliberate risk sources their motivation, capabilities and resources, along with how attractive the information looks to an attacker. Annex A describes risk sources by motivation and ability to act (→ ISO 27005 in the Cenedril wiki).

Sources

Frequently asked questions

Is my company of any interest to state actors at all?

More often than people think. The targets include far more than government agencies and defence firms. Research results, patents, negotiating positions and access to larger customers are all in demand. A supplier with remote maintenance access to an energy utility is often the easier path to the real target for a state attacker.

Can a mid-sized organization protect itself against intelligence services?

Not completely, yet it can raise the effort considerably and detect an attack earlier. Many state campaigns start with well-known means: targeted phishing emails, unpatched systems facing the internet, weak access for service providers. Closing these doors and analysing your logs forces the attacker to use more expensive methods.

How do I rate the likelihood for this risk source?

Through motivation and capability. The capabilities of state actors are high, so the deciding question is whether your information or your access is attractive to them. Sector reports from security authorities, warnings from your industry association and your own incidents help with the assessment.

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