A machine builder with 300 employees develops a new controller for wind turbines. A year before launch, a firewall vendor announces a vulnerability that has already been exploited for months. Forensics shows that design data and quote calculations sat on a foreign server for months, taken through exactly this device. Behind the attack was an actor with time, patience and a clear mission.
State actors are the risk source with the greatest resources. ISO/IEC 27005 lists them in Annex A as an example of risk sources described by their motivation and their ability to act. Their hallmark is endurance: they work over long periods, adapt their approach to the target and accept detours through suppliers and service providers to get there.
What is behind it?
This covers intelligence services, military cyber units and groups acting on behalf of a state or with its tolerance. Security vendors often report on them under the label “advanced persistent threat”. They pursue the political, economic or military goals of a state, and a single company is usually just one piece of the puzzle.
Resources and approach
- Staying power. Campaigns are planned over months. The first foothold is often kept quiet for a long time before any data leaves.
- Their own tools. State groups buy or discover vulnerabilities nobody knows yet and develop malware for a specific target.
- Detours through the supply chain. When the real target is well protected, they first compromise a software vendor, an IT service provider or a small supplier with access.
- Isolated networks. Some actors even reach networks without an internet connection, for example through prepared storage media or maintenance access.
Impact
Confidentiality comes first: design data, research, negotiating strategies and credentials. With sabotage, integrity and availability join in, for example when controllers are manipulated or systems are deliberately shut down during a political crisis. The damage often goes unnoticed for a long time, because the attacker has no interest in being seen.
Practical examples
Espionage through remote maintenance. A medical device manufacturer has its production lines maintained remotely by the supplier. The attackers first take over the supplier’s maintenance computer and from there enter the manufacturer’s network with valid access. What leaks is the dossier for an approval that was due to be filed the following year.
Tampered software update. Widely used administration software is manipulated at the vendor. The regular update installs a back door at thousands of customers. It is used at only a few selected organizations, among them a mid-sized aviation supplier.
Preparing for a crisis. During a routine check, a service provider finds an unknown program in the control system of a water utility. It has changed nothing, but it could switch off pumps on command. The analysis points to preparation for a possible conflict.
Typical threats
This risk source typically uses these BSI elementary threats:
- G 0.14 Information Gathering (Espionage): the main goal of most campaigns.
- G 0.21 Manipulation of Hardware or Software: prepared devices and updates.
- G 0.23 Unauthorised Access to IT Systems: the first foothold, often through an unknown vulnerability.
- G 0.30 Unauthorised Use or Administration of Devices and Systems: moving through the network with stolen credentials.
- G 0.15 Eavesdropping and G 0.13 Interception of Compromising Emanations: for particularly sensitive information.
- G 0.46 Loss of Integrity of Sensitive Information: in sabotage and targeted disinformation.
Effective controls
Prevention:
- A.5.19 Information Security in Supplier Relationships: requirements and checks for suppliers with access.
- A.8.8 Management of Technical Vulnerabilities: closing gaps quickly on systems reachable from the internet.
- A.8.22 Segregation of Networks: limits how far an attacker can move after the first foothold.
Detection:
- A.5.7 Threat Intelligence: evaluating warnings from authorities and your industry association about ongoing campaigns.
- A.8.16 Monitoring Activities: spotting unusual logins and data leaving the network.
Response:
- A.5.26 Response to Information Security Incidents: a prepared procedure that secures evidence and involves the authorities.
Risk sources in ISO 27005
ISO/IEC 27005 knows two routes to risk identification. In the event-based approach, risk sources and their objectives come first: who could want to harm the organization, what do they want to achieve, and through which interested parties do they get in? The asset-based approach starts from assets, threats and vulnerabilities. To estimate likelihood, the standard names for deliberate risk sources their motivation, capabilities and resources, along with how attractive the information looks to an attacker. Annex A describes risk sources by motivation and ability to act (→ ISO 27005 in the Cenedril wiki).
Sources
- ISO/IEC 27005:2022, clause 7.2 and Annex A.2.3: risk sources and desired end state
- BSI IT-Grundschutz Compendium: elementary threats G 0.13 to G 0.46
- ISO/IEC 27002:2022, clauses 5.7, 5.19, 8.8, 8.16 and 8.22