A software vendor runs a customer portal whose interface returns name, address and contract data for any sequential customer number. It only checks whether someone is logged in. Whether the record belongs to that person is never checked. Over several weeks, a program slowly retrieves every number from changing addresses. Months later the data set turns up in an underground forum, enriched with data from other sources and sorted by industry. To data brokers, your customer database is a commodity: they earn by volume, and every record has a price.
This risk source describes individuals and organizations that collect, combine and sell personal data without explicit consent, often through underground marketplaces. They do not appear separately in the table of attacker profiles in ISO/IEC 27005. Yet they form the market through which many other risk sources turn their loot into money or obtain their material.
What is behind it?
This covers collectors who read out websites and interfaces automatically, traders who buy up and resell data leaks, and providers who link records from many sources into profiles. Add to that the grey areas, such as advertising and analytics components in apps and websites that pass on more data than users suspect. Their business model depends on data being available in large quantities, and that is exactly where protection starts.
Resources and approach
- Faulty interfaces. Programming interfaces without a proper authorization check return records that do not belong to the person asking.
- Open storage. Misconfigured cloud storage and databases without a password are found by search services and harvested.
- Slow harvesting. Many small queries from changing addresses hardly stand out among the mass of normal traffic.
- Deception in customer service. Callers pose as customers and get addresses, contract details or credentials confirmed.
- Combining. Only the link with other sources makes individual data valuable, for example for targeted phishing or identity fraud.
Impact
The confidentiality of personal data is affected, and with it data protection law directly. For the data subjects, spam, targeted phishing, account takeovers and identity theft follow. For the organization, notification duties, enquiries from the supervisory authority, possible fines and claims for damages come on top. Then there is the loss of trust among customers who find their data in a forum.
Practical examples
Open cloud storage. For a campaign, a marketing agency places the export of all of a client’s newsletter subscribers in cloud storage that is publicly readable. A search service for open storage finds the file within a few days. The data set is copied and later offered in a bundle with other addresses.
Calls to customer service. A telecoms provider notices a cluster of calls in which people with only a few details ask for address changes and contract details. The data is used to place orders in other people’s names. Only a check using follow-up questions about characteristics that are not public stops the series.
Advertising component in the app. A gym’s app embeds an advertising component that transmits device identifiers, location and training times to a third party. Consent for this was never obtained. The third party builds profiles from it and sells them to advertising networks.
Typical threats
This risk source typically uses these BSI elementary threats:
- G 0.19 Disclosure of Sensitive Information: leaked, sold and passed-on personal data.
- G 0.28 Software Vulnerabilities or Errors: missing authorization checks in interfaces and applications.
- G 0.23 Unauthorised Access to IT Systems: access to databases and storage.
- G 0.42 Social Engineering: callers posing as customers.
- G 0.36 Identity Theft: the most common use of the traded data.
Effective controls
Prevention:
- A.8.26 Application Security Requirements: every query checks whether the record belongs to the user, and queries are limited in number.
- A.5.34 Privacy and Protection of PII: legal bases, consents and data flows to third parties are known and reviewed.
- A.8.10 Information Deletion and A.8.11 Data Masking: less data and masked copies reduce the value of any loot.
Detection:
- A.8.16 Monitoring Activities: recognizing unusual query patterns and mass retrievals.
- A.5.7 Threat Intelligence: evaluating indications of your own data in leak collections and on marketplaces.
Response:
- A.5.26 Response to Information Security Incidents: closing the gap, establishing the scope, meeting notification deadlines.
Risk sources in ISO 27005
ISO/IEC 27005 treats the table of attacker profiles in Annex A as a collection of examples and recommends in clause 10.1 considering all internal and external risk sources. Data brokers fit the target objective of financial gain, under which the standard explicitly lists identity theft as a typical way of cashing in. In the event-based approach, a look at the ecosystem pays off: agencies, service providers and embedded third-party components are often the easier route to your data. When discussing consequences, the standard explicitly mentions possible breaches of data protection law. In the language of the standard, personal data is a business asset that sits on supporting assets such as databases, interfaces and storage (→ ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management).
Sources
- ISO/IEC 27005:2022, clauses 6.4.3.2 and 10.1 and Annex A.2.2 to A.2.4: consequences, assets, risk sources, target objectives and ecosystem
- BSI IT-Grundschutz Compendium: elementary threats G 0.19 to G 0.42
- ISO/IEC 27002:2022, clauses 5.7, 5.26, 5.34, 8.10, 8.11, 8.16 and 8.26
- General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 33 and 34: notification and communication of data breaches