A manufacturer of packaging machines loses three tenders in a row to the same competitor, each time narrowly undercut. Only months later does the picture come together. A sales director who had moved to the competition had copied the costing tool to private storage shortly before leaving. In addition, the competitor had invited several of the manufacturer’s engineers to job interviews and asked very precisely about ongoing developments. Competitors want the same customers and contracts as you, and that is exactly why they know which of your information is valuable.
Market competitors are a risk source with a clear economic logic. ISO/IEC 27005 mentions the unfair competitor in Annex A among the pathological attackers and shows, in an example table, an aggressive business striving for a market monopoly. In the product, the risk source carries four motivations at once: gain, obstruction, influence and espionage.
What is behind it?
This covers direct competitors, new suppliers pushing into the market and anyone acting on their behalf. Watching competitors is normal and permitted through legal means. The risk source concerns the part that crosses the line: deception, bribery, taking documents, unauthorized access and deliberate damage to reputation. The attack is usually quiet, and it often looks like an entirely normal business transaction.
Resources and approach
- Hiring away knowledge. People who switch take experience with them, sometimes also files, customer lists and cost calculations.
- Targeted questions. Sham applications, job interviews, enquiries as a supposed customer and conversations at trade fairs yield details on prices and projects.
- Overhearing and picking up. Phone calls on the train, documents on the trade fair stand, a prototype at a customer meeting.
- Disinformation. Rumours about quality problems, fake reviews or false market information influence customers and decisions.
- Bought-in help. Detective agencies, data traders or professional hackers do what the competitor cannot or will not do itself.
Impact
The confidentiality of know-how, offers, calculations and customer relationships comes first. Lost tenders and departed customers can rarely be traced clearly to a leak, and that is precisely what makes the damage hard to measure. Damage to reputation affects the integrity of public perception, sabotage before a product launch affects availability. A head start that has leaked cannot be recovered.
Practical examples
At the trade fair. At a sensor manufacturer’s stand, a visitor posing as a buyer asks detailed questions about price tiers and delivery times. A second one photographs the prototype on display from every angle. In the evening at the hotel bar, two sales staff discuss the terms for a key account out loud.
Data as a farewell. In her last week, a design engineer copies the CAD data of a project to her private cloud storage. Six months later, her new employer launches a strikingly similar product. In court, the first question from the other side is which confidentiality measures were in place.
Rumours before the tender. Shortly before a large contract is awarded, anonymous posts about alleged failures of a product appear in an industry forum. Two review platforms show new, very similarly worded negative entries. The client asks for additional evidence, and the offer loses its lead.
Typical threats
This risk source typically uses these BSI elementary threats:
- G 0.14 Information Gathering (Espionage): cost calculations, design data, customer lists.
- G 0.42 Social Engineering: sham enquiries, sham applications and targeted conversations.
- G 0.15 Eavesdropping: conversations at trade fairs, on trains and in restaurants.
- G 0.16 Theft of Devices, Storage Media or Documents: prototypes, documents, storage media.
- G 0.22 Manipulation of Information and G 0.20 Information or Products from Unreliable Sources: planted rumours and false market information.
- G 0.30 Unauthorised Use or Administration of Devices and Systems: access of former employees that still works.
- G 0.43 Replaying of Messages: intercepted or altered communication, mostly through hired third parties.
- G 0.41 Sabotage and G 0.44 Unauthorised Entry into Premises: rare, yet conceivable when the stakes are high.
Effective controls
Prevention:
- A.5.12 Classification of Information: classifying and labelling trade secrets as such.
- A.6.6 Confidentiality or Non-Disclosure Agreements: with employees, service providers and partners before any exchange.
- A.6.5 Responsibilities After Termination or Change of Employment: what stays confidential after a move.
- A.8.12 Data Leakage Prevention: detecting and preventing unusual copies to private storage.
Detection:
- A.8.16 Monitoring Activities: mass access to design or sales data, especially during notice periods.
Response:
- A.5.28 Collection of Evidence: securing traces so they can be used in court.
- A.5.26 Response to Information Security Incidents: stopping the leak, establishing the scope, preparing legal steps.
Risk sources in ISO 27005
In Annex A, ISO/IEC 27005 distinguishes a risk source’s desired end state from its concrete objectives, and it explains the difference with a competition case: the end state is a contract won, and the objective along the way is the rival’s confidential negotiation information. In Table A.12 the standard shows an aggressive business that wants to dominate the market, for example by pushing out competitors, corrupting decision-makers or running defamation campaigns in social networks. The four motivations in the product correspond to the target objectives from Table A.9: “Spying”, “Influence”, “Obstacle to functioning” and financial gain. For your risk assessment the event-based approach works well: ask what a competitor wants to win, which of your assets would help it get there and through which people it can reach them (→ ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management).
Sources
- ISO/IEC 27005:2022, Annex A.2.3 and A.2.6: risk sources, target objectives and example scenarios
- BSI IT-Grundschutz Compendium: elementary threats G 0.14 to G 0.44
- ISO/IEC 27002:2022, clauses 5.12, 5.26, 5.28, 6.5, 6.6, 8.12 and 8.16
- German Trade Secrets Act (GeschGehG), section 2: definition of a trade secret