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Risk source · ISO/IEC 27005

RS10 Market competitors

Updated on 5 min Reviewed by: Cenedril Editorial
ISO/IEC 27005ISO 27001BSI IT-Grundschutz

A manufacturer of packaging machines loses three tenders in a row to the same competitor, each time narrowly undercut. Only months later does the picture come together. A sales director who had moved to the competition had copied the costing tool to private storage shortly before leaving. In addition, the competitor had invited several of the manufacturer’s engineers to job interviews and asked very precisely about ongoing developments. Competitors want the same customers and contracts as you, and that is exactly why they know which of your information is valuable.

Market competitors are a risk source with a clear economic logic. ISO/IEC 27005 mentions the unfair competitor in Annex A among the pathological attackers and shows, in an example table, an aggressive business striving for a market monopoly. In the product, the risk source carries four motivations at once: gain, obstruction, influence and espionage.

What is behind it?

This covers direct competitors, new suppliers pushing into the market and anyone acting on their behalf. Watching competitors is normal and permitted through legal means. The risk source concerns the part that crosses the line: deception, bribery, taking documents, unauthorized access and deliberate damage to reputation. The attack is usually quiet, and it often looks like an entirely normal business transaction.

Resources and approach

  • Hiring away knowledge. People who switch take experience with them, sometimes also files, customer lists and cost calculations.
  • Targeted questions. Sham applications, job interviews, enquiries as a supposed customer and conversations at trade fairs yield details on prices and projects.
  • Overhearing and picking up. Phone calls on the train, documents on the trade fair stand, a prototype at a customer meeting.
  • Disinformation. Rumours about quality problems, fake reviews or false market information influence customers and decisions.
  • Bought-in help. Detective agencies, data traders or professional hackers do what the competitor cannot or will not do itself.

Impact

The confidentiality of know-how, offers, calculations and customer relationships comes first. Lost tenders and departed customers can rarely be traced clearly to a leak, and that is precisely what makes the damage hard to measure. Damage to reputation affects the integrity of public perception, sabotage before a product launch affects availability. A head start that has leaked cannot be recovered.

Practical examples

At the trade fair. At a sensor manufacturer’s stand, a visitor posing as a buyer asks detailed questions about price tiers and delivery times. A second one photographs the prototype on display from every angle. In the evening at the hotel bar, two sales staff discuss the terms for a key account out loud.

Data as a farewell. In her last week, a design engineer copies the CAD data of a project to her private cloud storage. Six months later, her new employer launches a strikingly similar product. In court, the first question from the other side is which confidentiality measures were in place.

Rumours before the tender. Shortly before a large contract is awarded, anonymous posts about alleged failures of a product appear in an industry forum. Two review platforms show new, very similarly worded negative entries. The client asks for additional evidence, and the offer loses its lead.

Typical threats

This risk source typically uses these BSI elementary threats:

Effective controls

Prevention:

Detection:

Response:

Risk sources in ISO 27005

In Annex A, ISO/IEC 27005 distinguishes a risk source’s desired end state from its concrete objectives, and it explains the difference with a competition case: the end state is a contract won, and the objective along the way is the rival’s confidential negotiation information. In Table A.12 the standard shows an aggressive business that wants to dominate the market, for example by pushing out competitors, corrupting decision-makers or running defamation campaigns in social networks. The four motivations in the product correspond to the target objectives from Table A.9: “Spying”, “Influence”, “Obstacle to functioning” and financial gain. For your risk assessment the event-based approach works well: ask what a competitor wants to win, which of your assets would help it get there and through which people it can reach them (→ ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management).

Sources

Frequently asked questions

How realistic is espionage by competitors for mid-sized companies?

It happens, usually without drama. Typical routes are departing employees taking documents, targeted questions at trade fairs or job interviews with conspicuous interest in ongoing projects, and a technical attack is only one of several. Precisely because these routes are so ordinary, they are often not recognized as a risk.

What does the German Trade Secrets Act have to do with it?

Under the GeschGehG, information only counts as a trade secret if it is protected by reasonable confidentiality measures. Anyone wanting to take action against a competitor in a dispute has to prove these measures. Classification, confidentiality agreements and access restrictions from the ISMS are exactly that kind of proof.

How do I rate the likelihood?

Look at the structure of your market: how few suppliers share the contracts, how often are there tenders, how unique is your know-how? Frequent moves of employees to the competition and conspicuously well-fitting offers from the other side are warning signs. Past legal disputes with a competitor also raise the likelihood.

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