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Risk source · ISO/IEC 27005

RS02 Organized crime

Updated on 6 min Reviewed by: Cenedril Editorial
ISO/IEC 27005ISO 27001BSI IT-Grundschutz

A haulage company with 180 employees closes for the weekend. On Saturday morning every server shows the same text file: the data has been encrypted, the customer database copied, and unless payment in cryptocurrency arrives within seven days, the customer list will appear on a leak site. Forensics traces the start back three weeks, to a fake delivery notice email that harvested the credentials for remote access. The backup sat in the same network and had already been deleted. Organized crime runs like a business: it divides the work, aims for revenue and uses a business model that repeats with every organization that pays.

ISO/IEC 27005 lists criminal organizations in Annex A as one of the risk sources that can be described by motivation and ability to act. For this group the motivation is plain: money. The approach follows whatever turns into cash with little effort, whether that is extortion, fraud or the resale of data and access.

What is behind it?

This covers gangs, networks and groups that run IT-related crime as a business. They range from a handful of people sending fake invoices to groups with their own recruiters, negotiators and a help desk for paying victims. What unites them is the calculation: an attack is worth it when the return exceeds the effort.

Resources and approach

  • Division of labour. One group gains access and sells it on, a second rents out extortion software as a service, a third launders the money. Whoever attacks does not need to master every step.
  • Ready-made tools. Attack kits, phishing templates and malware are available in the relevant forums. Some groups even buy or find vulnerabilities for which no fix exists yet.
  • Double extortion. Before encrypting, the attackers copy data. Anyone who restores from backup is then blackmailed with publication.
  • Fraud without malware. Fake payment orders in the name of management, manipulated invoices with new bank details or a supposed IT help desk on the phone need no technology at all.
  • Volume and opportunity. Many campaigns run automatically against thousands of targets. Whoever leaves a known gap open gets hit.

Impact

Availability comes first: encrypted systems halt operations for days or weeks. Confidentiality follows when customer data shows up on leak sites, along with the direct financial loss from ransom or diverted payments. Where personal data is involved, GDPR notification duties apply, and organizations within the scope of NIS2 also report to the competent authority.

Practical examples

An invoice with new bank details. The attackers take over a supplier’s mailbox and read along for weeks. Shortly before a large payment, they send the genuine invoice from the genuine mailbox, only with changed bank details. Accounts payable transfers a six-figure sum to an account abroad.

Extortion with flooding attacks. Shortly before the Christmas season, an online retailer receives an email: either it pays, or its shop will be unreachable in the most important week of the year. A short demonstration follows the same evening and takes the shop down for an hour.

The friendly IT help desk. A clerk gets a call from a supposed service provider who needs to install an urgent update. Following instructions, she installs a remote support tool. Through this access, the attackers spread their extortion software across the network the following night.

Typical threats

This risk source typically uses these BSI elementary threats:

Effective controls

Prevention:

Detection:

Response:

Risk sources in ISO 27005

ISO/IEC 27005 describes two routes to risk identification. The event-based approach starts with the risk source and asks which end state it is after and through which partners and service providers it reaches its goal. The asset-based approach starts with assets, their threats and their vulnerabilities. For criminal groups, Annex A names financial gain as the target objective and stresses that the method of attack may come from other categories, such as data theft or encryption, while the purpose always remains money. The example scenarios in the standard include extortion carried out by distributing extortion software as a concrete attack path. To estimate likelihood for deliberate risk sources, the standard points among other things to the cost and benefit of an attack, the skills and resources of the attackers, and how attractive and exposed the information appears from their side (→ ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management).

Sources

Frequently asked questions

Should we pay the ransom after a ransomware attack?

That is a decision for top management, ideally with legal advice and after talking to the police. Paying guarantees neither a working key nor the deletion of stolen data, and the German BSI generally advises against it. If you settle the question in your incident plan beforehand, you do not have to answer it under pressure in the night of the attack.

Why would criminals attack us? We are small.

Because most of them do not pick targets one by one. Many groups scan the internet automatically for known vulnerabilities and open access points and strike wherever it is easy. A small organization pays less, yet it is often less well protected, which makes it attractive from a business point of view.

How do I rate the likelihood for this risk source?

The motivation is practically always there, and the tools can be bought freely. What decides the rating is your attack surface and your safeguards: internet-facing systems with open gaps, accounts without a second factor and backups in the same network all push the likelihood up. Your own incidents and situation reports from the authorities help with the assessment.

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