An engineering firm is planning the extension of a controversial motorway. One Monday morning, internal emails, site plans and minutes of meetings with the authority appear on a protest website. The firm’s home page shows a banner with slogans, and twenty protesters are sitting in the entrance hall. The activists had gained access to the mailbox weeks earlier through a fake invitation to a public consultation meeting. Hacktivists want to be seen: their success is measured in attention, and the targeted organization becomes their stage.
ISO/IEC 27005 lists ideologically motivated activists in Annex A as a risk source of their own. Their methods resemble those of terrorists, while their intent is less destructive. They want to spread a message, expose wrongdoing or stop a project, and they use social networks as an amplifier.
What is behind it?
This covers groups and individuals with political, environmental, religious or social causes. Alongside hacktivists, the standard also counts interest groups and sects. Some collectives are loosely organized and agree on actions spontaneously, others work on one topic for years. The trigger almost always lies outside IT: a decision, a project, a customer or a public debate.
Resources and approach
- Leaks. Internal documents, emails and personal data are published to make contradictions or wrongdoing visible.
- Defacement. Websites and social media accounts are taken over and display slogans or mockery.
- Flooding. Volunteers or rented services flood websites with requests, often for a few hours at a symbolic moment.
- Deception. Fake invitations, requests from supposed journalists or undercover job applications open doors.
- Presence on site. Occupations, blockades and covert recordings inside companies combine the digital action with images from the real world.
Impact
Confidentiality and reputation take the hardest hit. Published documents cannot be retrieved, and the public then decides how to read them. Defaced websites and fake content damage integrity. Employee data is especially sensitive: once the names and addresses of executives are published, an image problem turns into a question of personal safety.
Practical examples
Defaced careers portal. A pharmaceutical company runs its careers portal on an outdated content management system. Activists against animal testing use a known gap and replace the job ads with pictures and slogans. By the time the site is taken offline, screenshots are already circulating in several networks.
Undercover in the plant. An activist applies for a temporary job at a poultry farm. Over several weeks he films with a hidden camera and records conversations in meetings. The material appears, edited, in a television report.
Executives’ addresses. Under a pretext, activists call the reception desk and the HR department and gather private addresses and phone numbers of the management piece by piece. The list is published together with calls for protests outside their homes.
Typical threats
This risk source typically uses these BSI elementary threats:
- G 0.19 Disclosure of Sensitive Information: leaks of internal documents and personal data.
- G 0.46 Loss of Integrity of Sensitive Information: defaced websites and manipulated content.
- G 0.42 Social Engineering: pretexts on the phone, fake invitations, undercover applications.
- G 0.15 Eavesdropping: secret recordings of conversations and meetings.
- G 0.44 Unauthorised Entry into Premises: occupations and recordings on site.
- G 0.41 Sabotage: disruption of installations and processes, for example during blockades.
- G 0.34 Attack: in isolated cases, when a group resorts to violence against property.
Effective controls
Prevention:
- A.8.8 Management of Technical Vulnerabilities: keeping content management systems and websites up to date, since they are often the first target.
- A.6.3 Information Security Awareness, Education and Training: reception, HR and assistants recognize pretexts.
- A.7.2 Physical Entry: controlling access to the building and sensitive areas.
Detection:
- A.5.7 Threat Intelligence: keeping an eye on public calls and announcements in social networks.
- A.8.16 Monitoring Activities: detecting unusual access to mailboxes and file shares.
Response:
- A.5.24 Incident Management Planning and Preparation: defining roles for communications and legal counsel in advance.
- A.5.26 Response to Information Security Incidents: stopping the leak, securing evidence, informing those affected.
Risk sources in ISO 27005
In Annex A, ISO/IEC 27005 describes risk sources by two features: what drives them and what they are capable of. For activists, the target objective “Influence” from Table A.9 fits. The standard groups under it operations that aim to sway opinion, spread false information, reveal confidential information or damage an organization’s standing. Table A.8 offers categories for the desired end state. Anyone who wants to stop a construction project, for example, aims to limit what a third party can do. In the event-based approach you then ask which assets the group has to hit to get there and whether a partner or service provider is the easier route. For likelihood, the capabilities matter, and above all how attractive your organization is as a symbol (→ ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management).
Sources
- ISO/IEC 27005:2022, clauses 7.2 and 7.3.3 and Annex A.2.3 to A.2.4: risk sources, end state and target objectives
- BSI IT-Grundschutz Compendium: elementary threats G 0.15 to G 0.46
- ISO/IEC 27002:2022, clauses 5.7, 5.24, 5.26, 6.3, 7.2, 8.8 and 8.16
- General Data Protection Regulation, Art. 33: notification of a personal data breach