After a long conflict, an administrator is given notice. His personal accounts are disabled the same day. A service account he set up years earlier for a backup job, however, appears on no list. Two weeks later, at three in the morning, someone logs in through remote access with this account, deactivates the backup job and deletes several tables of the inventory management system. An avenger knows the weak spots precisely, because he used to manage them himself.
In Annex A, ISO/IEC 27005 describes the avenger as an attacker driven by a strong sense of grievance or injustice. What makes this attacker dangerous is the combination of determination and knowledge of the organization’s systems and processes. Where the data sits and how to cover tracks is already known.
What is behind it?
This covers employees, former employees, agency workers and service providers who feel they have been treated unfairly. The standard gives as examples the person dismissed for serious misconduct and the service provider whose contract runs out. The triggers are almost always events inside the organization: a dismissal, a missed promotion, disciplinary proceedings, a lost tender.
Resources and approach
- Existing rights. The easiest route is one’s own access while it still exists, or rights that go beyond the job.
- Forgotten access. Service accounts, shared passwords, remote maintenance access and keys that nobody had in mind at the departure.
- Knowledge of the weak spots. An insider knows which backup does not work, which logs nobody reads and when nobody is in the building.
- Concealed actions. Shared accounts, colleagues’ credentials and deleted logs make it hard to prove who did something.
- Physical routes. A badge that was kept, a key or simply being known at reception open doors even after departure.
Impact
Avengers mostly target integrity and availability: deleted data, sabotaged systems, destroyed devices. Confidentiality is often affected too, when customer data or internal documents get out or colleagues’ data is exposed. The damage is hard to contain because the perpetrator also knows the countermeasures, such as where the backups are kept. In rare cases the anger turns against people, and a security problem becomes a question of occupational safety.
Practical examples
Service provider at contract end. An IT service provider loses the support contract to a competitor. On the last day, its technician deletes the firewall configuration through the still active remote maintenance access, claiming it is his company’s intellectual property. The new provider rebuilds it from scratch in two days.
Grievance in sales. An employee in sales is passed over for a promotion. Over the following weeks she forwards customer lists to her private address and posts a salary overview, which she found in a wrongly shared folder, in an internal chat.
One account for everyone. At an operator terminal in production, all shifts share a single account. Several recipe parameters are changed and a batch is ruined. Because everyone uses the same account, nobody can establish who made the change.
Typical threats
This risk source typically uses these BSI elementary threats:
- G 0.32 Abuse of Permissions: using existing rights for harmful purposes.
- G 0.30 Unauthorised Use or Administration of Devices and Systems: through forgotten accounts and retained access.
- G 0.41 Sabotage and G 0.24 Destruction of Devices or Storage Media: deliberately disabling and damaging.
- G 0.46 Loss of Integrity of Sensitive Information: deleted or altered data.
- G 0.38 Misuse of Personal Data: taking or exposing customer or employee data.
- G 0.37 Repudiation of Actions: shared accounts and other people’s credentials conceal who did it.
- G 0.15 Eavesdropping and G 0.44 Unauthorised Entry into Premises: with knowledge of rooms, times and routines.
- G 0.34 Attack: in extreme cases, when the anger is directed at people or buildings.
Effective controls
Prevention:
- A.5.18 Access Rights: reviewing rights regularly and adjusting them immediately on a move or departure.
- A.6.5 Responsibilities After Termination or Change of Employment: what continues to apply after departure is agreed and known.
- A.8.2 Privileged Access Rights: keeping administrator rights scarce, assigning them personally and logging them.
- A.5.3 Segregation of Duties: critical actions require a second person.
Detection:
- A.8.15 Logging: recording privileged actions in a tamper-resistant way.
- A.8.16 Monitoring Activities: making access outside working hours and mass deletions stand out.
Response:
- A.5.28 Collection of Evidence: securing traces so they can be used under employment and criminal law.
- A.6.4 Disciplinary Process: a regulated, fair procedure for violations.
Risk sources in ISO 27005
ISO/IEC 27005 describes risk sources in Annex A by motivation and ability to act. With the avenger, the ability to act is closely tied to their position in the organization. In Table A.13 the standard shows an example scenario with an administrator as the risk source, who uses his rights to destroy sensitive documents directly in the database. As an event that can be monitored, it names direct database access outside normal working hours. For likelihood it matters that the motivation arises from events and can fade again. The standard provides for a fresh assessment of likelihood when circumstances change or new actors appear. A dismissal in the IT team or an escalating conflict with a service provider is exactly such an occasion (→ ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management).
Sources
- ISO/IEC 27005:2022, clause 7.3.3 and Annex A.2.3 and A.2.7: risk sources and monitoring of risk-related events
- BSI IT-Grundschutz Compendium: elementary threats G 0.15 to G 0.46
- ISO/IEC 27002:2022, clauses 5.3, 5.18, 5.28, 6.4, 6.5, 8.2, 8.15 and 8.16