A machine builder is fighting a former licensee in court over a patent. Shortly before the oral hearing, the head of the legal department receives an email that looks like a message from the court, with a brief attached. The document opens normally. In the background it installs a program that copies emails and notes on the litigation strategy for weeks. It later emerges that the attack was commissioned from an outfit that offers this kind of work for payment. Specialized outfits sell attacks as a service: whoever pays gets skills they would never have themselves.
In Annex A, ISO/IEC 27005 describes this risk source as a mercenary profile with high technical capability. These outfits share the amateurs’ appetite for a challenge, yet they work for money. Many develop attack tools that they make available, ready to use, to other attackers. They are therefore rarely the party that wants the attack, while they make other risk sources more dangerous.
What is behind it?
This covers professional hackers and small firms that sell attacks, tools or access. They include “hack for hire” providers, developers of malware and phishing kits, vulnerability traders and brokers who resell compromised access to third parties. Their clientele ranges from criminal gangs to competitors to individuals with a grudge.
Resources and approach
- Tailored tools. Malware is built for the target and altered so that common protective software does not detect it.
- Targeted deception. The emails are carefully researched, fit the recipients’ working day and often come from hijacked mailboxes of real partners.
- Bypassing the second factor. Phishing kits slip in as an invisible intermediary between user and the genuine service and steal the authenticated session along the way.
- Supply chain. Manipulated libraries, extensions or updates reach many targets through a single vendor.
- Division of labour. Whoever gains access sells it on. Whoever builds the tool rents it out. The actual attacker simply buys in.
Impact
The impact depends on the job. With espionage, confidentiality suffers, often unnoticed for a long time. With manipulated data or programs, integrity suffers, for example when invoices are diverted or software is altered. Because the tools are tailored to the target, safeguards that only recognize known patterns fail, and the attack only becomes apparent through its consequences.
Practical examples
Purchased access. In an underground forum, a broker offers VPN access to a manufacturer of industrial components, complete with details on turnover and headcount. An extortion group buys it. The break-in itself had happened months earlier through a VPN appliance that had not been updated.
Manipulated library. A software house uses a small open source library. The attackers take over the developer’s account and publish a new version with a back door. The automatic build pulls it in, and the software house’s customers receive it with the next update.
Mailbox despite one-time code. An employee in a wholesaler’s accounts department logs in on a convincing fake page and enters the one-time code. The attackers’ kit takes over the session, sets up a hidden forwarding rule and changes the bank details in pending invoices.
Typical threats
This risk source typically uses these BSI elementary threats:
- G 0.39 Malware: tailored espionage and extortion software.
- G 0.21 Manipulation of Hardware or Software: manipulated libraries, updates and extensions.
- G 0.23 Unauthorised Access to IT Systems: break-ins through vulnerabilities that are not yet closed or poorly closed.
- G 0.43 Replaying of Messages: intermediaries between user and service that capture logins and sessions.
- G 0.46 Loss of Integrity of Sensitive Information: altered invoices, data and programs.
Effective controls
Prevention:
- A.8.5 Secure Authentication: login methods that resist fake pages.
- A.8.8 Management of Technical Vulnerabilities: updating VPN appliances, firewalls and other internet-facing systems first.
- A.5.21 Managing Information Security in the ICT Supply Chain: checking origin and integrity of libraries and updates.
- A.8.7 Protection Against Malware: behaviour-based detection on endpoints and servers.
Detection:
- A.8.15 Logging: recording logins, rule changes and access in a traceable way.
- A.8.16 Monitoring Activities: analysing anomalies in these logs promptly.
Response:
- A.5.26 Response to Information Security Incidents: blocking access, ending sessions, establishing the scope.
- A.5.28 Collection of Evidence: securing traces in a way that holds up in court if the client is to be prosecuted.
Risk sources in ISO 27005
In Table A.7, ISO/IEC 27005 sets the specialized outfits apart from amateurs through their technical level and their pursuit of profit. The standard points out that these outfits create many of the tools that others then use to attack without any skills of their own. In its description of pathological attackers, it explicitly mentions that they can hand an attack over to such an outfit. An important rule follows for the risk assessment: never rate the capabilities of a risk source only by what it can do itself. A competitor or an aggrieved customer without IT knowledge can buy the capabilities of these outfits. For likelihood, the standard refers for deliberate risk sources to motivation, capabilities and available resources (→ ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management).
Sources
- ISO/IEC 27005:2022, clause 7.3.3 and Annex A.2.3: risk sources and target objectives
- BSI IT-Grundschutz Compendium: elementary threats G 0.21 to G 0.46
- ISO/IEC 27002:2022, clauses 5.21, 5.26, 5.28, 8.5, 8.7, 8.8, 8.15 and 8.16