Zum Hauptinhalt springen
Risk source · ISO/IEC 27005

RS03 Terrorist groups

Updated on 5 min Reviewed by: Cenedril Editorial
ISO/IEC 27005ISO 27001BSI IT-Grundschutz

During a tense political situation, a group calling itself a “cyber army” calls for attacks on utilities in a messenger channel. A few hours later the customer portal of a municipal utility is unreachable, flooded with requests. At the same time someone tries default passwords on the remote maintenance access of a pumping station. Neither is technically demanding. The group still publishes screenshots and claims to control the city’s water supply. For terrorist groups, effect is what counts: outages, fear and headlines matter more to them than technical finesse.

ISO/IEC 27005 names terrorists and cyber militias in Annex A as an example of risk sources. Their hallmark is the determination with which they act and their goal of disrupting operations and shaking trust in institutions. For most organizations, though, the risk is indirect: they rarely become the target themselves, yet they feel the consequences of an attack on power, networks or service providers in their surroundings.

What is behind it?

This covers groups that pursue political, religious or ideological goals through violence or the threat of it. In the IT space they appear as cyber terrorists or as loosely organized militias that mobilize volunteers through social networks. The line to state-directed groups is sometimes blurred, for example when a militia acts in the interest of a state without officially belonging to it.

Resources and approach

  • Flooding. Attacks that knock out websites, portals or emergency services with requests are cheap to obtain and quickly produce visible effects.
  • Known gaps. Many groups fall back on published vulnerabilities, default passwords and poorly protected controllers on the internet.
  • Defacement. Hijacked websites display propaganda and are meant to prove that the opponent is vulnerable.
  • Physical attacks. Arson on cable ducts, substations or radio masts hits supply networks and with them many organizations at once.
  • Threats. A bomb threat alone can have a building evacuated for hours without anything actually happening.

Impact

Availability comes first: supply, communication and access to buildings fail. In industrial plants and utilities, a manipulated setpoint can turn into a danger to life and limb. On top of this comes the loss of trust, since the public effect is often greater than the technical damage. Restoring physical infrastructure usually takes much longer than rebooting servers.

Practical examples

Evacuating the data centre. A data centre operator receives an anonymous bomb threat. The police clear the building for six hours; the equipment keeps running, yet nobody may enter. A customer whose firewall fails during exactly this window can do nothing, because it has no second site.

Attack on the power supply. Unknown persons set cables on fire at a substation during the night. A business park is without power for two days. A manufacturer with a standby generator keeps working, while its neighbour without backup power loses production and also a database that was damaged when the power went out.

Controller on the internet. A group searches specifically for plant controllers that are connected to the internet without protection. At a small water association it changes a setpoint using a default password. An employee in the control room notices the change in time, and the group still circulates a video of the intrusion.

Typical threats

This risk source typically uses or triggers these BSI elementary threats:

Effective controls

Prevention:

Detection:

Response:

Risk sources in ISO 27005

ISO/IEC 27005 broadly distinguishes two directions in the objectives of risk sources: either the attacker uses the resources of its target for its own benefit, or it wants to stop the target from using its resources. The standard names terrorism explicitly under the second direction, together with sabotage and destabilization. The fitting target objectives are “Influence” and “Obstacle to functioning” from Table A.9, which reappear as motivation in the product. For the likelihood of deliberate risk sources, the standard lists among other factors the influence of terrorist organizations. The asset-based approach helps with treatment: a threat such as a failure of the power supply can be rated against the affected assets, whether an attack or a technical defect lies behind it (→ ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management).

Sources

Frequently asked questions

Does an ordinary company need to consider terrorism at all?

Yes, though usually briefly. Direct attacks mostly hit critical infrastructure, public authorities and symbolic targets. Any organization can be affected indirectly, for example by a power outage after an attack on the grid or by a cordon around its site. The continuity planning you need anyway often covers these consequences.

How do I tell terrorists from hacktivists?

By their intent. Both often work in technically similar ways, yet terrorists want to destroy, destabilize and spread fear, while hacktivists mainly want to spread a message. In the risk assessment the difference shows in the impact, which with terrorists can extend to danger for people.

How do I deal with the low likelihood?

Rate it honestly low and rate the impact honestly high. That usually results in a medium risk, which you treat with business continuity measures. Such measures work against many causes at once, and that is what makes them economical.

No Cookies!

This wiki collects nothing, bakes nothing and leaves nothing behind. There's nothing to consent to. Privacy doesn't get better than this.