A client loses a court case against his tax advisory firm over a fee invoice. Over the following months, fake reviews appear online first. Then several of the firm’s clients receive emails from a deceptively similar domain saying that the bank details have changed. Finally, the man offers a cleaner money to let him into the offices in the evening. Pathological attackers are hard to predict, because their drive is personal and barely follows effort and return.
ISO/IEC 27005 lists this risk source in Annex A with pathological or opportunistic motives that are sometimes combined with a pursuit of gain. As examples, the standard names the unfair competitor, the dishonest customer, the swindler and the fraudster. Typically, these perpetrators obtain the capabilities they need in various ways, up to bribing people inside the organization.
What is behind it?
The label covers individuals with very different motives: fraudsters who systematically exploit gaps in processes, customers who feel cheated, people fixated on a particular person, and opportunists who sense a chance. What they share is a drive that economic logic only partly explains. That is why they keep going long after the effort has stopped paying off.
Resources and approach
- Other people’s identities. Fake accounts, look-alike domains and the names of real employees lend credibility.
- Pressure and extortion. Threats against the organization or against individuals, for example to publish private content.
- Bribery from inside. Cleaners, temporary staff, service personnel and customer service employees have access and are rarely the focus of security.
- Manipulated information. Forged receipts, reviews and documents are meant to influence decisions or reputation.
- Bought-in skills. Where their own knowledge falls short, tools from the internet or a hired outfit of professional hackers fill the gap.
Impact
The damage ranges from financial loss through fraud to manipulated data and reputational harm from false claims. It weighs especially heavily when the attack targets individual employees: harassment, extortion and the spying out of private data put a heavy burden on those affected. For the organization, this brings duties of care and possibly notification duties under the GDPR.
Practical examples
Fraud with other people’s identities. A customer of an online spare parts retailer uses stolen personal data to open dozens of accounts and orders on invoice. When this is noticed, he sends forged payment receipts and swamps customer service with complaints and threats.
Blackmailing an employee. Someone builds trust with a customer service employee through a social network. Weeks later, the person threatens to publish private chat histories unless she exports customer data. The employee reports the incident, because her employer has set up a confidential reporting point for such cases.
Fixation on a person. An employee’s former partner still knows her password for the company webmail. He reads her messages, moves appointments in her calendar and sends short emails to colleagues in her name.
Typical threats
This risk source typically uses these BSI elementary threats:
- G 0.35 Coercion, Extortion or Corruption: threats against people and bribery of insiders.
- G 0.36 Identity Theft: fake accounts, look-alike domains, misused names.
- G 0.22 Manipulation of Information: forged receipts, reviews and documents.
- G 0.30 Unauthorised Use or Administration of Devices and Systems: with known or fraudulently obtained credentials.
- G 0.44 Unauthorised Entry into Premises: with the help of bribed people.
- G 0.46 Loss of Integrity of Sensitive Information: altered appointments, messages and records.
Effective controls
Prevention:
- A.6.3 Information Security Awareness, Education and Training: employees recognize approaches and fake identities.
- A.8.5 Secure Authentication: a second factor makes known passwords worthless.
- A.7.2 Physical Entry: rules for entry outside working hours, including for external staff.
Detection:
- A.6.8 Information Security Event Reporting: a simple, confidential reporting channel.
- A.8.16 Monitoring Activities: spotting logins from unknown devices and mass exports.
Response:
- A.5.26 Response to Information Security Incidents: protecting those affected, blocking access, securing traces.
- A.5.5 Contact with Authorities: involving the police early in cases of extortion and threats.
Risk sources in ISO 27005
In Table A.7, ISO/IEC 27005 describes three ways in which pathological attackers proceed: with their own IT knowledge, with attack tools from the internet, or by handing the attack to a specialized outfit. The standard adds that they may turn to an internal source, such as discontented employees or unscrupulous service providers, in order to corrupt them. In clause A.2.3 b), the standard mentions that motivations can also be one-off or rooted in a psychological condition. Since a motivation cannot be expressed directly, it suggests describing it through the desired end state. For the risk assessment this means: put into words what the perpetrator wants to achieve, and derive from it which assets and which people he has to hit to get there (→ ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management).
Sources
- ISO/IEC 27005:2022, Annex A.2.3: risk sources and desired end state
- BSI IT-Grundschutz Compendium: elementary threats G 0.22 to G 0.46
- ISO/IEC 27002:2022, clauses 5.5, 5.26, 6.3, 6.8, 7.2, 8.5 and 8.16