Friday afternoon, and a project is stuck on a blocked connection. An administrator changes the firewall directly in production, without a test and without a second opinion, so that the team can continue on Monday. The new rule is broader than intended and, as a side effect, makes the database server reachable from the internet. For three weeks nobody notices. Most employees mean no harm: mistakes come from time pressure, routine and gaps in processes, and that is exactly where the risk assessment comes in.
This risk source stands for employees and partners who mishandle the organization’s assets through a lack of care, knowledge or resources. In its definition, ISO/IEC 27005 states that human risk sources can act intentionally or unintentionally. This page is about the unintentional side, and there is no motivation.
What is behind it?
This covers everyone who works with the organization’s information and systems: employees, managers, temporary staff, interns and partners such as IT service providers, agencies, consultants or building services. They have access because they need it for their work, and every access carries the possibility of a mistake. The long list of threats shows how varied such mistakes are.
How mistakes arise
- Time pressure and overload. People under pressure skip the test, the four-eyes principle or the documentation.
- Lack of knowledge. Rules nobody has explained are not followed, for example when personal data is sent through private services.
- Convenience. A colleague lends out his account, rights are extended “temporarily” and never withdrawn, a password is stuck to the screen.
- Missing resources. Too few staff, too little storage, too little time for maintenance, and the only knowledge about a system sits in one head.
- Poor planning. Systems grow without anyone adjusting the security requirements.
Impact
Unintentional mistakes hit all three protection goals. Data is lost or changed by accident, devices are left on the train, systems fail after a faulty change. Misdirected emails and wrongly shared folders are especially common and lead to data breaches under the GDPR. Many incidents that first look like an attack start with a mistake in-house.
Practical examples
The wrong recipient. A clerk in HR sends the payroll list to a colleague with a similar name. The email program’s autocomplete had suggested the wrong contact. The recipient works in another department and, fortunately, reports the error at once.
One head, one system. The only administrator who knows the backup system is off sick for six weeks. During this time the backup job fails every night, and the warnings land in his mailbox. When a hard disk fails, the data of the past weeks is missing.
The agency’s test copy. To track down a bug, a web agency uploads a copy of the customer database to its test server. The test server is reachable from the internet without a password, because it was only needed “briefly”. A security researcher finds it and contacts the client.
Typical threats
This risk source typically triggers these BSI elementary threats:
- G 0.31 Incorrect Use or Administration of Devices and Systems: misconfigurations and operating errors.
- G 0.18 Poor Planning or Lack of Adaptation: systems and processes that have not kept pace.
- G 0.45 Data Loss and G 0.46 Loss of Integrity of Sensitive Information: deleted, overwritten or wrongly changed data.
- G 0.17 Loss of Devices, Storage Media or Documents and G 0.24 Destruction of Devices or Storage Media: devices left behind or damaged.
- G 0.33 Loss of Personnel and G 0.27 Lack of Resources: knowledge and capacity missing at the decisive moment.
- G 0.29 Violation of Laws or Regulations and G 0.38 Misuse of Personal Data: out of ignorance, for example when passing on data.
- G 0.30 Unauthorised Use or Administration of Devices and Systems, G 0.32 Abuse of Permissions and G 0.37 Repudiation of Actions: borrowed accounts, rights that are too broad and actions that later cannot be attributed to anyone.
Effective controls
Prevention:
- A.6.3 Information Security Awareness, Education and Training: explaining rules with examples from your own daily work.
- A.8.32 Change Management: planning, checking, approving and being able to roll back changes.
- A.5.37 Documented Operating Procedures: describing important procedures so that a deputy can handle them too.
- A.5.20 Addressing Information Security Within Supplier Agreements: setting out partners’ duties when handling your data and systems.
Detection:
- A.6.8 Information Security Event Reporting: a simple way to report mistakes and near misses.
- A.8.15 Logging: making changes and access traceable.
Response:
- A.8.13 Information Backup: being able to undo mistakes.
- A.5.27 Learning from Information Security Incidents: analysing causes and improving processes.
Risk sources in ISO 27005
According to the definition in ISO/IEC 27005, there are human, environmental and technical risk sources, and human ones can act intentionally or unintentionally. In the list of typical threats in Table A.10, the marker “A” stands for human actions that damage information by accident, such as operating errors or the abuse of rights. Because this risk source has no motivation, the factors for deliberate perpetrators do not apply. For accidental risk sources, the standard instead names influences that favour human error when it comes to likelihood, and it explicitly lists human acts and omissions among the aspects of the likelihood criteria. In the event-based approach, partners belong to the ecosystem, meaning the interested parties through which risks enter the organization (→ ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management).
Sources
- ISO/IEC 27005:2022, definition 3.1.6, clauses 6.4.3.3 and 7.3.3, Annex A.2.4.1 and A.2.5.1: risk sources, likelihood, ecosystem and typical threats
- BSI IT-Grundschutz Compendium: elementary threats G 0.17 to G 0.46
- ISO/IEC 27002:2022, clauses 5.20, 5.27, 5.37, 6.3, 6.8, 8.13, 8.15 and 8.32