A computer science student tries out a search engine for internet-connected devices. He finds the web interface of the building automation of a conference hotel, protected by the password from the vendor’s manual. For fun, he turns the heating in every conference room up to maximum at night and switches the outdoor lighting on and off in rhythm. A screenshot ends up in a forum, complete with the hotel’s name. Amateurs look for an open door, no matter whose door it is.
ISO/IEC 27005 names amateurs in Annex A as a risk source of their own. This means people with little to good IT knowledge who are mainly after recognition, fun or a challenge. Their attacks are simple, yet thanks to freely available tools they achieve more than their skills would suggest.
What is behind it?
This group includes curious teenagers, students, gamers trying out cheats and tricks, and people who want to test their first skills. The inexperienced among them are known as “script kiddies”, because they run ready-made scripts without fully understanding what those scripts do. A personal grudge against the target is usually absent. The target is whatever happens to be open.
Resources and approach
- Broad searching. Scanners and search engines for internet-connected devices show within minutes where webcams, controllers or old servers are exposed.
- Default passwords. Many devices run with the factory password, and lists of these passwords are public.
- Known gaps. For published vulnerabilities, ready-made code often circulates within a short time, and all that is left to do is to run it.
- Tools for listening in. In open Wi-Fi networks, unencrypted connections can be intercepted and altered with freely available programs.
- Dares on site. Some enter buildings and technical rooms out of curiosity or to film a video.
Impact
The damage usually stays limited: a defaced page, altered data, a crashed system. It gets dangerous when an amateur breaks something out of ignorance that he does not understand, or publishes captured data to show off. The standard explicitly points out that attacks for fun can also have serious consequences. There is a second effect as well: wherever an amateur finds an open door, criminals find it too.
Practical examples
Grades in the learning platform. A pupil looks over a teacher’s shoulder and sees her password for the learning platform. In the evening he logs in and improves his grades and those of two friends. It only came to light when the school reports were printed.
Listening in at the café. A student tests a program for intercepting connections in a café next to an office building. Several employees working there during their lunch break log in to an old intranet without encryption over the open Wi-Fi. Their credentials appear in plain text on his screen.
A data set as a trophy. A young woman finds a gap in the customer portal of a regional utility through which database queries can be injected. To prove it, she downloads several thousand customer records and posts an extract on social media. For the utility, a notifiable data breach follows.
Typical threats
This risk source typically uses these BSI elementary threats:
- G 0.23 Unauthorised Access to IT Systems: through default passwords and known gaps.
- G 0.22 Manipulation of Information: altered grades, content or game scores.
- G 0.46 Loss of Integrity of Sensitive Information: defaced pages and damaged data sets.
- G 0.43 Replaying of Messages: listening in on and altering connections in open networks.
- G 0.44 Unauthorised Entry into Premises: dares and explorations on site.
Effective controls
Prevention:
- A.8.8 Management of Technical Vulnerabilities: closing known gaps before ready-made attack code gets around.
- A.8.9 Configuration Management: no factory passwords, no unnecessary services, secure default settings.
- A.8.20 Networks Security: administration interfaces reachable only from the internal network or through VPN.
- A.7.2 Physical Entry: keeping technical rooms and side entrances locked.
Detection:
- A.8.15 Logging: recording login attempts and changes to content.
- A.8.16 Monitoring Activities: spotting clusters of failed logins and unusual queries.
Response:
- A.5.26 Response to Information Security Incidents: closing the gap, establishing the scope, checking notification duties.
Risk sources in ISO 27005
ISO/IEC 27005 describes risk sources in Annex A by their motivation and their ability to act. With amateurs both are weak, which tempts people into the misjudgement that they can be ignored. The matching target objective in Table A.9 is called “Challenge, fun”, and it is exactly there that the standard stresses that the consequences for the victim can be serious despite the absence of any intent to harm. For likelihood, the standard asks you to consider how easily vulnerabilities can be exploited. That very factor determines the risk from amateurs. In the asset-based approach they therefore show up almost by themselves: at every asset that can be reached from outside and has a known vulnerability (→ ISO/IEC 27005 Information Security Risk Management).
Sources
- ISO/IEC 27005:2022, clause 7.3.3 and Annex A.2.3: risk sources and target objectives
- BSI IT-Grundschutz Compendium: elementary threats G 0.22 to G 0.46
- ISO/IEC 27002:2022, clauses 5.26, 7.2, 8.8, 8.9, 8.15, 8.16 and 8.20
- German Criminal Code, section 202a: data espionage